Thursday, November 30, 2023

CostCo- Valuation

(Disclaimer: Excel file attached below the post) 

Retail Industry

In anticipation of Costco's fist quarter results in the first week of December, I wanted to take the time and analyze the intrinsic value of the company based off of its most recent 10K issued on 09/03/2023. Before I proceed on to my analysis, if you are solely interested in the excel file, scroll all the way down and engage yourself with downloading it, but if you'd like to stick around for a while and allow me to run you through my analysis, well then, let's look at Costco's share price over the course of last year:

        Source: Barron's CostCo Equity Page

Costco's pure dominance is vividly on display, but what is the true value of the company? Is the current share price $593.45 (as of the writing of this post) justified given its operations? I set out to assess the company based off its last 5 years' financial history. 
Before I delve deeper into the valuation, I think it is prudent to take a few seconds and discuss the market, its dynamics, and Costco's operations both in the US and abroad. 
Retail business, as one can imagine, is highly competitive, and companies have to not only spend capital to attain and retain consumers, but also have to be effective at finessing the general macro and economic environment. Slow growth in the near future- driven by inflation, high interest rates, and earnings- will keep the retail industry in check. According to Deloitte, GDP is forecasted to grow at 0.9% in '23, down from roughly 2% in '22. In the case of a recession, the economy could contract further giving rise to unemployment. In the current macro environment, inflation has lowered consumers' purchasing power despite gains in nominal income due to strong labor market and other factors. Retail and service businesses (mainly) suffered vastly due to consumer pullback and mandatory restrictions during the pandemic. Additionally, inflation and high rates, driven by extensive growth in money supply before and during the pandemic, are also chewing away at regular Joe's wallet. But, it isn't all dark in the retail industry; consumers have begun spending on services again, and have also started frequenting bars, restaurants, and various other social events and soirees. After that succinct overview of the industry and its outlook, lets peel the onion on Costco's operations. 
Costco primarily engages in membership warehouses in the US and other parts of the world such as Puerto Rico, Canada, Mexico, Japan, UK, Taiwan, and China to name a few. The company also owns and operates e-commerce websites in various parts of its territories. As of the end of 2021, Costco had more than 800 stores worldwide. As of the end of 2023, the company had 316,000 employees under its employ; which, given its 242B revenue in FYE23, translates to approximately $766,740 per employee.  
Costco is highly dependent on the efficiency of its US and Canadian operations; the operations in both the countries comprised 87% of net sales and 84% of operating income in '23. Given the company's vast real estate portfolio-the company owns 861 pieces of land and building worldwide, 184 of which are leased- Costco might be negatively impacted by the sector's poor projected performance in the future. Costco also competes with other competitors- Walmart, Target, Amazon, Sam's Club, and BJ's- in terms of identifying and obtaining suitable locations for its stores. Investing in brick and mortar is not the only avenue of growth for the company; consumers' behaviors and trends are also changing, and so heavily investing in online, delivering, and e-commerce shopping could be an additional path for growth along with memberships (renewal rate of 92.7% in US and Canada and 90.4% worldwide) and same store sales growth. 

 Valuation


As of the time of this valuation, Costco had a weighted average cost of capital of 8.91% (could be different for you depending on where you get your financial information from), and net debt of ($4.7B)- given its cash reserves and short term investments. Going back 5 years (FY2019-FY2023), Costco's top line grew from $152B to $242B, yielding a CAGR of 12.2% over the course of 5 years. Costco's revenue consists of net sales and membership fees, both of which were $237B and $4.5B respectively in '23. Net sales witnessed a modest growth of 6.7% while membership fees grew at a rate of 8.4% in '23. In my base case scenario, I project net sales to grow at a CAGR of 9.2% from $254B in '24 to $562B in '33; and membership fees to grow at a CAGR of 9.3% from $4.9B in 2024 to $14.4B in '33 yielding total revenues of $259B in '24 to $576B in 2033. I believe that my base case scenario runs parallel to the company's historic performance. Numbers, as one would expect, change drastically if we move to the weak case, which in my model serves to indicate a possible recession and consequently lower growth in both net sales and membership fees- feel free to download the file and have fun with the numbers.

My model predicts modest EBITDA margins of 4.3% throughout the projected years- '24-'33. As for the operating income (EBIT), base case scenario predicts EBIT to grow from $8.8B in '24 to $20.4B in '33, yielding a CAGR of 9.8%. Moving on to Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT), the model predicts a modest growth throughout the future years; my analysis showcases a CAGR of 43.1%, growing from $6.5B in '24 to $15.1B in '33. 


Moving on to other items in the analysis. Costco's CapEx (Additions to Property and Equipment) have been around 1.7% of total revenues for the last few historic years, and given its stage in the life cycle, I doubt that will change, and so in my base case, I have kept CapEx flat at 1.7% of total revenues: $4.4B in '24 to $9.8B in '33. I am assuming that over the course of the 10 years of this analysis, Costco will only be spending enough to update its existing PP&E. Therefore, I grow D&A (Depreciation and Amortization) from 53.2% of CapEx in '24 to 100% of CapEx in '33, which essentially means that the company will stop growing and will only have to spend enough to update its existing portfolio of property and equipment. Historic Net working capital (NWC) ranges from 4.0% of revenues to 6.0% of revenues from FY19-FY23, and so consequently, in base case, I have kept NWC at 4.5% of revenues throughout the projected years. 
My calculations tell me that Costco has pretty healthy Unlevered Free Cash Flows (UFCF) throughout the years (I promise it wasn't by design). I expect Costco's UFCFs to grow from $4.6B in '24 to $17.5B in '33. Taking the stub period into account, and leaving mid-year to reviewer's discretion, the sum of all of the PVs of future UFCFs comes out to $61.4B, discounted at a WACC of 8.91%. 


As for the long term growth, I believe I have been generous because I think Costco will grow at 3% in perpetuity; generous because 2% is typically what economists expect a healthy nation's economy to grow at. I chose 3% because I believe Costco has a well defined position within the industry, and I expect that to persist, along with other factors such as consumer trends and the need for the retail industry as a whole. Given a long term growth rate of 3%, I calculate UFCFs of $18B in '34, and given a WACC of 8.91%, I calculate the the terminal value  to be $306B. This gives us a present value of TV of $133B. My model and calculations yield a total value of Costco's operating assets (net of its operating liabilities) to be $194B. Costco has net debt of negative $4.7B, putting out an equity value of $199B. As per Costco's '23 10K, the company had 445,785,572 diluted shares outstanding, including unvested RSUs of 3,045 ( I couldn't find any options disclosure in the 10K), giving us an intrinsic value of $446.63 per share. 

Conclusion

At the time of this analysis, Costco is trading at $593.45/share. Based on my assumptions and estimates, I feel that in my base case, Costco is trading 32.8% higher than its intrinsic value of $450.88/share. For my best case scenario, which essentially means that economy won't suffer from recession- mild or otherwise- Costco seems undervalued by about 13.2% with an intrinsic value of $672.22. Finally, My weak case, or recession scenario, predicts an intrinsic value of $307.76 per share. According to the weak case, Costco is trading 92.83% higher than its intrinsic value. With all that being said, There is a well known adage that gets tossed around in the valuation world: "DCF is entirely driven by assumptions." Some of you might or might not agree with my analysis and assumptions, and that is why I have attached the excel file for your review. So, feel free to download the file and play around with the numbers. Also, feel free to reach out with constructive feedback. 


Links:


 

Wednesday, October 11, 2023

High Rates and Chill?


Quantity Theory and Bezzle

I have almost every finance/economic/wall street related app stored on my mobile device, and the reason is as personal as it is professional; I am personally vested in everything that culminates in the capital markets, the omnipresent forces of supply and demand and their impact, both positive and negative, and lastly, having updated information on the aforementioned helps me perform well at my job. The amount of notifications that I have gotten from all the applications is staggering to say the least. Notifications have been about everything from interest rates, fixed income, bond yields, to troubles in the real estate lending market and transactional activity. Rummaging through the articles and reading pundits' thoughts and ideas on the economy made me think of two integral concepts, or at least I think they are important, that seem to have been lost to economic and financial history as well as investors' collective conscience: Quantity Theory and Bezzle.
Milton Friedman once quoted, "Time delay between changes in the quantity of money and in other magnitudes are 'long and variable' and depend a great deal on surrounding circumstances." We seem to have either forgotten or do not give as much credence to the relationship between money, nominal income, and real income growth as we should. Yes, the FED has stopped hiking for now, forgive me if you are in the "they will hike once or twice more camp," but I am wary of the economic consequences that we have yet to witness due to the instantaneous hiking that Powell and Co. have already done. There is deluge of information on economic studies that have conveyed the aforementioned relationship with great eloquence, and so my purpose here is not to regurgitate the studies, but rather to summarize the results, and hopefully I will be able to properly demarcate the said relationship. The studies have concluded that there is a one to one relationship between the growth of money and the nominal income and inflation within an economy. When the government- through fiscal or monetary policies- increases the growth of money, it leads to inflation and thus higher nominal income, albeit in the long run, i.e., 12-18 months- this is the lagging affect you might have heard professionals and pundits use throughout various financial interviews recently. For instance, think about the easy money policy the FED enacted for more than a decade after the great recession and what that growth led to. Additionally, growth in money leads to a lower proportional decrease in real income. Economic studies have concluded that growth in money might even lead to negative real income. 
On to the second concept known as bezzle. It is an economic term coined by John Kenneth Galbraith back in the day and addresses issues circumnavigating wealth that people seem to think they have, but lack in reality. Galbraith further noted that bezzle is abundant during exuberant times, and narrows during recessions. For instance, think about the lofty and sky high valuations, market performance due to positive news and expectations, and humongous increase in pricing for nearly every asset. The concept entails that even though the investors/owners thought they had access to all of this accumulated wealth, factually they were setting themselves up for a heart wrecking. An easy way to think about this is just to pick an equity, any of the FAANGs or another stock, and look at the gargantuan valuations and as a result insane and unsustainable stock prices, and consequently, higher market caps. What happened at the beginning of Covid-19? Anyone care to venture a guess? You guessed it, valuations plummeted, cash flows got riskier, and cost of debt started to inch up, and all of this, among other factors, led to a drop not just in stocks but entire indices. All of a sudden, wealth that people thought that they had, vanished overnight. This is called bezzle. 

Higher for Longer

Now that we have these two important concepts out of the way, lets address the current state of affairs. 
The economy has proven remarkably resistant, and other facets such as the unemployment rate and consumer spending have so far remained steadfast, but there is a reckoning to come. Higher rates have taken a more concrete position, and the higher cost of debt will soon creep up on companies and firms from across all industries. The only immune companies will be the ones with healthy cash reserves; companies with healthy cash cushions are raising capital despite of the higher rates, think of the Pfizers, Apples, and Googles of the world. But companies with below investment grade ratings, also known as high yield and junk, could face their Everests in the coming months. Companies issued gigantic amount of debt, all thanks to FED's quantitative easing, and a huge chunk of that debt is due in '24, '25, and '26. Debt issued pre-Covid had a cost of debt ranging anywhere from a 100 basis points to 300 basis points, but the refinancing of that debt, or pushing maturities into the future will entail taking on debt but with much higher interest rates which is simply unsustainable for most capital structures. A day before this post, I read about WeWork not being able to make interest payments and are looking to attain favorable terms from their lenders. We will be reading an abundant amount of articles regarding companies' failure to meet their obligations in the near future. 
Couple higher rates and cost of debt with potential revenue losses and you have a recipe for disaster. Companies will see their EPS shrink due to a smaller numerator, one of the ways to rectify this loss in wealth is to reduce the number of shares through buybacks or reverse splits, both of which could prove grueling given the current circumstances. Lower EPS will lead to a fall in stock prices which will ultimately push their cost of doing business even higher; suppliers and other business partners will begin asking for upfront payments rather than deferred, and managements will have to comply. These are just some of the issues awaiting companies in the near future, and I am certain there will be tougher decisions to be made down the line.
Higher for longer narrative, it seems, has finally caught roots as companies are beginning to borrow despite of the sky rocketing cost. According to Bloomberg, September was one of the highest months in terms of raising corporate debt, to the tune of  more than a $100 Billion. As stated prior, companies have debt that is maturing in the next couple of years and companies tend to raise more debt to repay or retire their old debt at least 18 months before the maturity; this allows the companies to prevent the upcoming maturities from appearing in their financial audits. C-Suite and executives have made their peace with the reality of higher rates for longer, and are compelled, partially by nature and partially nurture, to raise more debt in this environment. The hope is that they will proceed with bearing the brunt for a couple of years and when the rates do decline in the future, they will be able to retire higher rate with lower rate debt.  
Higher rates aren't all bad news. There are sectors of the economy that have picked up pace and are likely to grow in the current macro trends; namely the private credit industry. After the fall of Credit Suisse and SVB, traditional banks have lately been hesitant to underwrite more loans due to high interest rates and consequently higher chances of borrowers' defaulting or missing payments. This is where private credit has stepped up its game and hedge funds, private equity funds, and other alternative asset managers have begun to underwrite one jumbo loan after another. These private institutions get a great leeway in determining their returns due to the vary nature of their existence: private credit and loans are done behind closed doors, and do not require registration with the SEC. This allows the private credit managers to charge higher rates and even demand some sort of an equity kicker at the end. I will foreshadow, though, that this will not persist for long; mainly because banks have picked up the scent and have restarted conducting transactions, but also because the private credit- albeit is roughly around $1.5 Trillion- market will become more saturated as more institutions and banks enter the space. Private credit of course comes at a higher price tag for the borrowers, but companies- in current environment- do not have the number of avenues they used to just a couple of years ago. Private credit market, as a result, has been able to provide returns higher than some of the other segments of the investment world. Although the private credit market seems enticing, it does have its short comings. The biggest drawback is the fact that these loans are made behind closed doors and therefore do not require SEC registration, it is hard for anyone to quantify the risks involved and the bubble building that could end up hurting the larger economy. Regulators understand the thirst within this particular field and have begun to consider changing rules and regulations to enhance transparency and protect investors' interests. It remains to be seen what those will be and what their affects will be on the PC market as well as on other segments of the economy. 
Finally, I would be remiss if I didn't mention real estate lending and the whirlwind of a ride that its having. To take a trip down memory lane, after the recession of 2007-08, big banks suppressed making real estate loans and left a vacuum that regional and community banks were more than happy to fill. Fast forward to today, banks are exposed to roughly $3 Trillion in real estate loans and cracks have started to appear. Contractors and developers are either defaulting on loans, or are not as passionate about the industry as they were between 2015-21. Some of the developers have even begun to surrender their collateral or the buildings to the banks; this, of course, presents another issue for the banks which is that yes, they have their collateral and buildings, but the only way to get their funds back is to liquidate those holdings, and that is where the wrinkle is. Do you know anyone who willing to buy a building worth $50M in these market conditions? $75M? or a $100M? Ergo, regional and community banks are forced to not only write off those loans but also hold on to these tangible assets till an appropriate time to sell.
In conclusion, no one knows what the future holds. All of the understood and accepted metrics of measuring financial markets' success, bonds and equity performances, and various other macro and micro trends are in smithereens. I am not sure if I am echoing the generally accepted commentary by saying this, but I believe we have to wait and watch. One thing is for certain, portfolio managers and investors have their work cut out for them. 

Sunday, March 19, 2023

Where To From Here? Ramblings On the Latest Banking Crisis!

I, too, as anyone who is even fractionally enthralled by financial news, not to mention every breathing publication out there, am wondering what is next? Where do we go from here? How would Chairman Powell and the FED proceed from the unfortunate occurrences of the past two weeks? What about equities, Bonds? These are just some of the questions in a long list of unfathomable concerns every retail or institutional investor has. This post is my humble attempt to not only contextualize everything, but also opine as to what I think might happen.

When the news broke about Silicon Valley Bank, I wanted to see how the markets reacted, and what better way to ascertain the collective emotions of the entire market than our age old favorite the "VIX index." The tumultuous news of SVB caused the VIX to hit new highs since October last year (as shown below):

    Source: Wall Street Journal (Mar 13, 2023)                                                    

The markets have been on a roller-coaster ride because of the Keynesian approach the government took during the pandemic, and the consequential turmoil due to inflation, skyrocketing energy prices, and billions of greenbacks that citizens had access to and saved up. Without having SVB in the picture, market participants were already at a loss as to what the terminal rate would be, where the economy was headed, and most importantly, whether or not the FED would be able to tame inflation and drag it down to 2%- not to even mention the entire conversation on soft, hard or no landing. Investors were getting bewildered with every report that came out; If CPI report came within the confines of acceptability, retail numbers came in higher, if energy prices were coming down, the labor market continued to show its resiliency. No one had an inkling, let alone knew, what was going to happen, but that didn't stop pundits from prognosticating. The banking crisis has further exasperated the tumult that investors were already having a hard time navigating. 

The SVB crises, in my humble opinion, was the culmination of high interest rates, poor risk management, and misuse of uninsured deposits for venture debt, along with I am certain myriad of other issues. Everyone adores easy money and low interest rates for obvious reasons, but few tend to understand what high interest rates mean, not in terms of tightening the money supply, but also in relation to the banks' liabilities vis-à-vis the deposits. Without taking a deep dive into the banking business model, banks have deposits that they need to make sure they can match when consumers come asking for them, in SVB's case, they invested heavily- before the rate hikes- in long-term bonds with low yields, and with rate hikes, the demand for their holdings went down because which sane and risk avert investor would buy long-term bonds- even the ones with virtually low risk such as the US treasuries- with low yields when the bonds started trading at higher rates due to the hikes. So when it came to the depositors asking for their money, SVB couldn't match the demand and had to sell their AFS securities (with low yields) at steep discount resulting in losses worth billions. Additionally, SVB's attempt to raise $1.8 billion seemed to have also struck a nerve with the markets, and resulted in the infamous "run on the bank." 

SVB, as it turns out, because of their symbiotic relation with VCs and Silicon Valley, was also taking a stab at venture debt. They were lending dollars to venture capitalists for their funds as a quid pro quo for their [VC's] portfolios of companies banking with SVB. This was highly unusual, and some might even say should be illegal, for a bank because the money they used for these loans were the billions of uninsured deposits they had on their balance sheet. What SVB should have done was marked their holdings to the market on a regular basis and rebalanced their portfolio according to the FED's quantitative tightening and the macro environment. What does that mean? It means that they should have sold their holdings with low yields and swapped them with high yielding short-term investments, this would have saved them billions not just in case of their market value but also because when depositors were attempting to withdraw their money, SVB would have been able to sell their short-term investments relatively quickly and at a fair price as well as match the demand one-to-one, this was quite aptly referred to as "duration mismatch," by Chamath and the group on their weekly All-In podcast. 

So why wasn't the banking crisis contained when SVB was put into receivership, and especially after when the government backstopped and guaranteed their deposits? Well, I think, that was more related to human nature than capital markets and the heartbeat of the economy. The potentiality of SVB's customers loosing their money lead to the deluge of withdrawals from other regional banks such as Signature (which was also put into receivership) and First Republic. All wasn't lost for the banking industry, though, as Bank of America saw $15 billion in deposits in the wake of all the withdrawals from regional banks; BofA, I am positive, was not the only one, as other major banks such as JPM, Citi, and Wells Fargo must have had their own exponential increases throughout the course of this predicament. First Republic was arrested from SVB and Signature's fate, and had an influx of $30 billion deposits from major banks in order to restore confidence in the bank meeting its obligations and the overall visage of the banking industry. 

The crisis that started with a relatively infant bank, when compared to other major international, and too-big-to-fail banks, quickly spread across the globe as Credit Suisse came under enormous pressure, and as of the publication of this post, has been acquired by UBS for effectively pennies on the dollars. But, will this acquisition- effectively led by the Swiss government- coupled with US authorities' efforts and various facilities that have been established be enough to shore the risk in markets?

I have always thought that the best measure of the collective risk in the market is best defined by yields on various US treasuries i.e., 2- and10-year notes. Short-term yields have cratered since the whole banking debacle, and investors are rushing to not only park their cash, but also park it securely. The 2-year yield curve (as shown below) clearly shows how bad the situation is now, the yield slumped from over 500 bps to 384 bps over the course of the last two weeks; I am not even going to get into the inversion and the spread between 2- and 10-year treasuries. 

Source: CNBC (March 13, 2023)                                                         

The bond market is vividly telling us that the market is expecting the FED to either bring their rate hikes to an abrupt stop or that there are only one or maybe two 25 bps hikes in the books and that the FED might even have to initiate a reduction in the fed funds rate by the end of this year. The demand for short-term bonds have skyrocketed and those that had them in their portfolio will without a doubt either intend to keep them on the books as the potential of future yields being lower than current ones have escalated or, given the current enormous demand, they can choose to sell them for a hefty profit. What happens when the demand for a security kisses the sky? That's right, the trading spread has increasingly widened, making it harder to trade short-term securities such as the 2-year treasuries. We can see what this means for the bonds, but what does it entail for the equities' market? That remains to be seen, but personal hypothesis is that stocks will decline as the risk of recession looms high and as the emigration of funds into the bonds market continues, at least up until the FOMC's meeting next week.  

Stocks closed in a relatively good place this past week due to the helping hand extended by the major banks to First Republic, but the market's sentiment towards the ginormous merger of UBS and Credit Suisse will be on full display in pre-trading and normal session on Monday; I doubt it will have the effect that the governments and regulators are anticipating, don't get me wrong, it will have an impact but miniscule in nature and not nearly the seismic event that they might be hoping for. Markets and investors have grown wary and I don't believe that this will be enough to cool the markets down. FOMC meetings have grown in importance ever since the rate hikes began, but the meeting next week is of an exponential importance. Everyone will be fixated on what the FED does in terms of its policy rate and on what the future plans are for rate hikes and the economy as a whole. 

FED and Chairman Powell are in a precarious situation to say the least. If they stop the rate hikes, they risk kickstarting the economy, which given the retail numbers and tight labor market, won't be much of an issue, but if they do continue to hike, the risks may further permeate to banks worldwide and other sectors of the financial markets as well. The bond market has already priced in a reduction by the end of this year, and if the FED acts in a contrarian manner, it might spook the markets further. I think that the FED will have to tiptoe and make sure they don't knock over anymore dominoes with their missteps; I further believe that they will have to raise the rates at next week's meeting, at least 25 bps- given the CPI, along with core inflation, PCE, retail numbers, and last but not least, the labor market. 

Lets leave the technicalities aside and briefly discuss the morality of it all because, to some, this feels eerily similar to the "bailouts" of 2008. Allow me to excuse you, dear reader, of the notion that this is in any shape or form similar to what happened in 2008; for starters, banks are in far better financial shape than they were back during the financial crisis, and to all those asking where the $600 billion facility is being funded from, well, that is the result of last decade of banks depositing their funds into the Federal Reserve. The creditors, bond holders, and stock owners have all lost every last cent they had in SVB, and the average joe is not at all footing the bill this time around. But, I would be remiss if I didn't mention the obvious byproduct, or maybe side-effect, of all the backstops and mergers that are happening now in order to stem any doubts in the markets: Maybe the fact that governments are scrambling all of their resources to shield the banks and turmoil from reaching to the far reaches of the markets might lead to people becoming more complacent and taking on even more risky bets because of the omnipotent presence of the government's protection behind the curtains.

We can all maneuver with conjecture, but the fact of the matter is that we are players of a very dangerous game, and there will always be winners and losers, the trick is to not boast too much when we win and to chin up when we loose. As far as the markets and morality of it all is concerned, time will tell, but I will say this, as humans, I wouldn't put too much faith in ourselves.